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Abstract. Full autonomy seems to be the goal for system developers in almost 
every area of the economy. However, as we move from automated systems to 
autonomous systems, designers have needed to insert humans to oversee auto-
mation that has traditionally been brittle or incomplete. This creates its own 
problems as the operator is usually out of the loop when the automation hands 
over problems that it cannot handle. To better handle these situations, it has 
been proposed that we develop human automation teams that have shared goals 
and objectives to support task performance. This paper first summarizes a body 
of research to develop ground station automation support for single pilot 
transport operations. Then  the paper will describe an initial model of Human 
Automation Teaming (HAT) which has three elements: transparency, bi-
directional communications, and human-directed execution. Transparency in 
our model is a method for giving insight into the reasoning behind automated 
recommendations and actions, bi-directional communication allows the opera-
tor to communicate directly with the automation, and finally the automation de-
fers execution to the human. The model was implemented through a number of 
features on an electronic flight bag (EFB) which are described in the paper. The 
EFB was installed in a mid-fidelity flight simulator and used by 12 airline pilots 
to support diversion decisions during off-nominal flight scenarios.  Pilots re-
ported that working with the HAT automation made diversion decisions easier 
and reduced their workload. They also reported that the information provided 
about diversion airports was similar to what they would receive from ground 
dispatch, thus making coordination with dispatch easier and less time consum-
ing. These HAT features engender more trust in the automation when appropri-
ate, and less when not, allowing improved supervision of automated functions 
by flight crews. 
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1 Introduction 
In every area of the economy there are plans to move from manual (human controlled 
systems) to autonomous (no human required systems). As the technology needed to 
support this rapid movement has improved, almost on a daily basis, there is greater 
recognition that human oversight of these systems will be needed in the near future. 
For example, when automakers and robot designers use the term autonomy they gen-
erally mean: autonomy within a limited range of functions or for a broad range of 
functions with human oversight. Before proceeding with the discussion of Human 
Autonomy Teaming, we would like to offer a few definitions of autonomous from 
Dictionary.com[1]: 
Government.  a. self-governing; independent; subject to its own laws only. b. per-
taining to an autonomy or a self-governing community.   
Business. having autonomy; not subject to control from outside; independent:  
a subsidiary that functions as an autonomous unit. 
 
(of a vehicle) navigated and maneuvered by a computer without a need for human 
control or intervention under a range of driving situations and conditions: an au-
tonomous vehicle. 
 
These definitions clearly describe systems that have both the ability and freedom to 
make independent judgments. However, some of our most advanced systems – Way-
mo’s self-driving car, Tesla’s auto-pilot – still require human oversight. For example, 
current “autonomous” cars have significant problems dealing with traffic when it is 
directed by people (e.g., flagmen or police officers) and with static objects in the 
roadway [2] [3]; thus, the need to team up autonomous systems with humans to im-
prove overall system safety and efficiency. When People are paired with automation, 
even when that automation has a certain level of autonomy, this pairing does not 
equate to human autonomy teaming. HAT requires that there be some level of coop-
eration and coordination in achieving goals.  
This paper tells the story of how our research at NASA in support of work on sin-
gle pilot operations (SPO) and reduced crew operations (RCO) came to incorporate 
HAT. The goal of that research was to explore the possibility of reducing the crew 
complement on commercial flight decks from two pilots to one. Based on task analy-
sis, a concept of operations was developed that called for automation and a ground 
operator (similar to a dispatcher) to support the single pilot. Our initial prototype 
ground stations provided an ability to coordinate with a human ground operator, and 
provided (increasing levels of) automation. As we included more automation, our 
research participants expressed distrust of the automation and uncertainty about the 
rational for the suggestions recommended by the automation. This led us to begin 
work to make the automation act more like a teammate. 
After a brief discussion of our pre-HAT work, this paper will present our initial vi-
sion for HAT, followed by a discussion of our HAT implementation to support an 
advanced airline dispatcher ground station and a final implementation of HAT tools 
on the flight deck. The majority of data reported in this paper will be flight dispatcher 
and commercial transport pilot ratings and their comments on the usability and ac-
ceptability of the HAT tools. 
2 Pre-HAT SPO/RCO work 
2.1 Technical Interchange Meeting 
NASA began its work on SPO by convening a technical interchange meeting (SPO 
TIM) to discuss the feasibility of SPO [4]. Two types of challenges resulting from the 
removal of the second pilot were often mentioned: workload and redundancy (see also 
[5]). The consensus of attendees was that to make SPO feasible, workload needed to 
be reduced to a level where a single pilot could handle it. Also, and perhaps more 
important, removing the second pilot raises issues about how to replicate the redun-
dancy currently provided which is required for certification and flight safety. The 
group converged on two approaches to the workload and redundancy problem: 
onboard automation or external support from other people. 
2.2 Experiment 1: Together versus Apart 
In our first experiment, we evaluated the effect of crews working together, versus 
being in separate locations, on crew communications and workload (see Figure 1), as 
suggested by Thomas Sheridan at the SPO TIM [4] [6]. In this study flight deck au-
tomation replicated that found on current transport category aircraft. Ten two-pilot 
crews flew both together and at separate redundant ground stations, while resolving 
off-nominal diversion scenarios. 
Lessons Learned. In this experiment we found that while control manipulations 
can be acknowledged non-verbally in two-pilot operations, acknowledgement may be 
forgotten or require extensive radio use. Additionally, there is a risk of shared situa-
tion awareness (SA) being reduced when pilots are physically separated. Pilots ap-
peared to have increased uncertainty about roles and responsibilities (e.g., Do I have 
the aircraft or do you?), uncertainty about control manipulation (e.g., Are you enter-
ing the altitude?) and uncertainty about completed actions (e.g., Did you put that in 
the CDU?). 
Based on these results and additional feedback from our pilots, we developed tools 
to facilitate remote collaboration – Crew Resource Management (CRM) Tools. These 
tools were then implemented in our ground station and evaluated in the next experi-
ment. 
 
Figure 1: Pilots flew together on the left and captain and first officer separated on right. 
2.3 Experiment 2: Higher fidelity with CRM tool manipulation. 
In our second experiment 18 two-pilot crews flew high-workload off-nominal scenar-
ios that required diversions [7]. However, this time our CRM indicators showed roles 
and responsibilities, shared charts, shared flight deck displays and video that allowed 
the pilots to see each other (see Figure 2). As in the first experiment, crews flew side-
by-side in a baseline configuration, (this time in a high-fidelity full motion simulator) 
and separated. In the separate condition the captain remained on the flight deck and 
the first officer flew a prototype ground operator station that incorporated aspects of 
both a flight deck and an airline dispatch station. To assist in planning diverts, the 
ground station was equipped with a rerouting tool incorporating a previously devel-
oped NASA technology, the Emergency Landing Planner (ELP; [8], [9]), that as-
sessed the suitability of airports near the aircraft and returned recommendations for 
which airport would make the best divert. This tool also provided routing information 
to the selected airport. A simple dispatcher task to reroute aircraft around convective 
weather was introduced. 
Lessons Learned. Data from this second experiment was generally positive for our 
shared tools (CRM indicators, video, flight deck displays, and shared charts) although 
pilots had multiple suggestions for improvement. A communication analysis showed 
that crews spent more time communicating, shared more decision-relevant infor-
mation and were more responsive to each other when CRM indicators were available, 
suggesting these tools directed crewmembers’ attention to their joint responsibility for 
safe decision-making [10]. We also found that when the captain requested assistance 
from the ground dispatcher, the dispatcher focused on that aircraft and stopped per-
forming the rerouting task. We concluded that a ground operator working off-nominal 
aircraft should be relieved from servicing other aircraft. This procedure is similar to 
current practice in Airline Operations Centers: dispatchers often hand off their nomi-
nal aircraft to other dispatchers and give one-on-one support to aircraft that need to 
divert. We refer to this one-on-one mode of operation as dedicated assistance. 
 
Figure 2: SPO II Ground Station. CRM indicators circled on the right and video of the cockpit 
circled on the left. 
2.4 Experiment 3: Investigation of situation awareness issues 
In the third study we tested two concepts of operation. If SPO was to be considered 
for implementation, a ground operator must give dedicated assistance to aircraft in 
high workload or off-nominal situations. However, in order for SPO to be cost effec-
tive, the ground operator must handle more than one aircraft. In this third study we 
evaluated two ground station concepts of operation: 
 
Specialist, in which the ground operator only performs dispatch functions 
and hands the aircraft to a separate person (pilot) who provides dedicated as-
sistance to the aircraft when needed; and 
 
Hybrid, in which the ground operator performs dispatcher functions and, 
when needed can hand off all other aircraft and provide functions during   
dedicated assistance. 
 
The CRM tools and the ELP [8] were similar to those in the previous experiment 
(see Figure 3) [5]. In this experiment thirty-five commercial airline pilots participated. 
In the hybrid condition a ground operator (the participant pilot) acted as a dispatcher 
until one troubled aircraft (a confederate pilot) had an off-nominal situation, at which 
time the dispatcher entered dedicated support; assuming the role of first officer for 
that flight and handing off the other aircraft. Varying the level of interaction the 
ground operator had with both the ‘‘to-be-troubled’’ aircraft and with the airspace in 
general, prior to dedicated support, allowed us to look at the effects of this initial ex-
posure on performance. In the specialist condition, the participant pilot was simply 
handed the troubled aircraft with a brief message (e.g., “Sir, flight 123 needs dedicat-
ed assistance”) without  prior exposure to either the flight or other environmental 
conditions such as the weather. 
 
 
Figure 3. SPO III Dispatch Ground Station: (a) flight deck displays for the selected aircraft; (b) 
TSD, ACL with ELP recommendations; and (c) CRM tools and sharable charts. 
Lessons Learned. We found no performance difference between our two ground 
station support concepts - hybrid and specialist. This suggests that with the tools pro-
vided participants could gain sufficient SA to perform the task relatively quickly. 
From a concept of operations perspective, it suggests that the decision of whether to 
have ground pilots waiting to take over distressed aircraft or increase training -cost 
and time- for flight-followers could be made on economic grounds. 
Overall, participants found the ground station tools (Information on the aircraft 
control list (ACL), shared charts, the traffic situation display (TSD) with ELP rec-
ommendations, and CRM indicators) to be useful. Of particular interest were their 
impressions of the ACL. Pilots reported that the ACL improved their SA. One pilot 
commented, “I would like to see a lot more info on the ACL. I really liked the con-
cept.” 
2.5 Experiment 4: Monitoring Multiple Aircraft 
The previous three experiments focused on the ability of a ground-based flight-
follower to perform piloting duties, sometimes helping to manage a single-piloted 
aircraft under high workload and off-nominal conditions. This study examined the 
ability of this flight follower to work with a fleet of aircraft. These flight-followers 
could not actually control the aircraft as they could in the previous studies, however, 
with additional automation they did perform some of the functions normally associat-
ed with the pilot not flying/monitoring in a two-person crew.  
In order to facilitate the increased monitoring task, a new Aircraft Monitoring and 
Management System (AMMS) was introduced. This system gathered data from vari-
ous sources (e.g., monitoring weather data, ATC clearances, aircraft position, and 
EICAS alerts) and placed prioritized alerts on a redesigned ACL when threats were 
detected (see Figure 4)[5]. The route replanning tool, presented to the left of the TSD, 
used in Experiment 3 was augmented to display ATIS at the destination airport as 
well as indicate which of a number of risk factors were present in any potential divert 
location [12] [13]. Operators could request ratings for airports that were not recom-
mended by the tool and could adjust the weighting of various factors going into the 
recommendation. The modified tool was renamed the Autonomous Constrained Flight 
Planner, ACFP. Five certified dispatchers and five commercial airline pilots partici-
pated in the build one evaluation. Participants ran two one hour-long scenarios. Each 
scenario required participants to make approximately six diversions using the ground 
station tools. 
 
 
Figure 4. Build 1 Ground Station. Bottom center, ACL, augmented with timeline, alerting 
information; above the ACL is the TSD; to the left is flight controls and displays for the select-
ed aircraft in read-only mode; on the right is CONUS map and charts.  
 
Lessons Learned. The dispatchers and pilots were very positive about the ground 
station. Specifically, they agreed that the automation and displays did a good job of 
integrating information. They found that the alerts reduced the workload of the moni-
toring task. They also found the ACFP route replanning tool useful;‘‘The ACFP is 
outstanding… We like to be able to verify stuff, so what is really cool is you guys 
have that ability, you don’t just blindly trust, you can verify by literally looking at the 
ATIS and say, ‘Ah! I think that is pretty accurate.’. However, they also had signifi-
cant issues with risk ratings. One participant reported, “I was not always sure what the 
tool was prioritizing: weather, distance, or time. [Because of this] I skewed my deci-
sions more toward a personal judgment.” 
Voice recognition and voice synthesis technologies were used to support both the 
ability to perform some functions by voice and to receive briefings from the ground 
station. However, our system lacked robustness and thus was not fully utilized by the 
operator. It also did not show the proper etiquette, speaking over the operator and 
pilot. We also found that dispatchers and pilots differed in their attitude toward the 
concept of enhanced ground support. While dispatchers were eager for the additional 
information and tools at the ground station, pilots on the other hand were more cau-
tious about interruptions from the ground. 
3 Our Concept for HAT 
Based on these initial studies it was clear that the automation tools which were de-
signed and implemented in the ground station were helpful in performing the flight-
following task. Thus, we continued to work with dispatchers and pilots to develop 
more automation. However, there were issues noted with respect to transparency and 
trust in the automation. Thus, in the next series of studies we began to integrate new 
collaborative decision making technologies [14] [15] [16], which we will collectively 
refer to as human-autonomy teaming or HAT.  
3.1 Why HAT? 
HAT attempts to address a long standing issue with automation: while engineers at-
tempt to develop systems for as many foreseeable conditions as possible, these sys-
tems inevitably end up in conditions they cannot handle. Sometimes this is because 
the engineers could not find a way to handle the situation. Typically in these cases the 
manual will explicitly call for the human operator to take control (e.g., the autopilot 
shutting off on Air France 447). In other cases, the engineers simply did not foresee 
the conditions. In either case, the human operators suddenly find themselves in tricky 
off-nominal conditions, often with little understanding of how they got there [17]. 
To overcome these issues, we sought to develop a framework for HAT in which 
automation could be treated as a teammate. Over the last 40 years, aviation has devel-
oped a model for good teamwork referred to as Crew Resource Management, or 
CRM. Our initial HAT framework focused on three design tenets inspired by CRM: 
transparency, bi-directional communication (including a shared language), and opera-
tor directed execution. [18] 
3.2 HAT Tenets 
Transparency: Good CRM between humans requires team members to understand 
what the others are doing and why. When teaming with automation, intention is often 
less intuitively obvious, so understanding the reasoning of the automation is neces-
sary. Transparency of the automation has to do with whether its functioning is easily 
understood by operators.  Operators must have knowledge of the general logic of how 
it works so that they can develop accurate mental models of its functioning, and be 
able to discern what mode the automation is in [17].  In the case of early fly-by-wire 
aeronautics systems, for example, test pilots placed little trust in the automation be-
cause the functioning was obscure to them [19]. 
Bi-Directional Communication: Good CRM between humans requires people 
with different information to enter a dialog about how best to achieve their goals. This 
implies explicit discussion of goals (as opposed to intent inferencing), as well as con-
fidence, and rationale. To facilitate this dialogue a shared language or “phraseology” 
is needed to improve communication efficiency. This dialogue can be initiated with 
plays called by the operator. The play is an adaptable system of assigning specific 
tasks prior to a mission based on delegated agreements that can be invoked by the 
human. 
Operator Directed Execution: Good CRM requires someone to be responsible for 
final decisions and that decisions should be explicit. Through the use of “plays” this 
responsibility is ascribe to the human, and will continue to be for the near future. This 
does not mean that the automation can never act autonomously. Through the use of 
plays operators can still delegate tasks to automation, but only the human can execute 
the final action. However, we argue that automation should be adaptable. Goals, oper-
ating modes and levels of automation should change at operator direction or based on 
prior agreements. 
3.3 HAT Agent 
The HAT tenets described above give us general guidelines for implementing HAT. 
An important (and, to date, unanswered) question is the degree to which specific im-
plementations can be used across multiple kinds of automation. That is, can we devel-
op a “HAT Agent” that would add teaming capabilities to a variety of automation? 
This HAT agent could encapsulate a number of important teamwork functions such as 
maintaining a goal structure, coping with counterfactual “what if” questions, and un-
derstanding when to interrupt an ongoing task. It might also provide interfaces for 
HAT interactions such as cooperative decision-making and calling, modifying, and 
monitoring plays (a type of share plan of action, see [15]). A sketch of such an agent 
is presented in Figure 5[18]. 
 
 
Figure 5: Initial model of HAT interactions. 
4 Implementing HAT for RCO 
In our initial implementation of HAT based on CRM principles, we developed an 
agent that only mimics intelligence because the knowledge that it presents is instanti-
ated by our programmers and not learned through an interaction with the real world. 
However, as discussed in the next section, we attempted to imbue our ground station 
with the HAT principles outlined above. 
4.1 Experiment 5 :HAT no HAT 
Experiment 5 was based on the HAT tenants outlined above and a human automation 
teaming approach was taken to the design of ground station automation. 
The interface was implemented using the playbook approach to set goals and man-
age roles and responsibilities between the operator and the automation [15]. It provid-
ed 13 different plays the operator could call to address off-nominal airspace and sys-
tem simulation events. When the operator selects a play, the ACFP is initiated with 
preset weights, and the corresponding play checklist appears on the display identify-
ing shared operator tasks in white and automation tasks in blue (see Figure 6)[20]. As 
per our tenets, the operator was always responsible for executing any recommenda-
tions. 
 
 
Figure 6. Operator Directed Interface for calling plays in the HAT condition and associated 
checklist of roles and responsibilities. 
 
For Bi-Directional Communication, weights were preset for each play and present-
ed in slider bars (top of Figure 7). The operator was able to negotiate with the system 
by altering these weights to what the operator considered appropriate for the situation. 
The operator can perform “what if exploration” by changing the weights to see how 
the divert recommendations are affected. Using the example shown in Figure 7, if the 
operator decided that estimated time of arrival (ETA) to the airport was a higher pri-
ority than available services, the operator could adjust the ACFP weights and find 
new recommendations. 
 
Figure 7. Transparency and Bi-Directional Communication in the HAT condition implemented 
by ACFP recommendations (on bottom) and weights (on top). 
 
To address the significant task of monitoring 30 aircraft, an aircraft monitoring and 
messaging system (AMMS) was implemented in the ACL. The AMMS alerted the 
dispatcher to any non-normal events associated with the aircraft: 
Weather along the current cleared path 
Deviations from the current cleared path – both track and altitude 
Adverse event at the destination airport that would render the airport unusable 
(weather minimums, airport closures, etc.)  
Any system problems on the aircraft 
Previous research indicates that autonomous cooperation between robots can im-
prove performance of human operators [21] and improve team performance. The idea 
of autonomous agents reporting problems to a central authority (call center) was pro-
posed by Xu in 2012 [22]. Google maintains a call center to oversee its self-driving 
cars. The ACL coupled with the AMMS reduces the monitoring task of our ground 
station operator. The AMMS with its access to the information listed above allows the 
system to diagnose any problem and alert the operator, freeing up resources which 
can be used to service additional aircraft. During	this	study	four	flight	dispatchers	and	two	pilots	participated.	After	3.5	hours	of	 training	on	 the	ground	station,	 they	managed	 the	 flight-following	 task	during	two	50	minute	scenarios,	with	and	without	HAT	tools.	During	a	scenario	they	managed	approximately	30	aircraft,	and	worked	with	our	pseudo-pilots	to	complete	six	diversions.	During	the	study	we	collected	subjective	and	objective	data;	only	the	subjective	data	is	reported.		
Lessons learned. In a study comparing ground stations with and without HAT, 
ground station operators (both dispatchers and pilots) preferred the ground station 
with HAT over the station without HAT features. They reported that the ground sta-
tion with integrated HAT features (ACFP and AMMS) were preferred for keeping up 
with operationally important issues. Workload in the HAT condition was lower, as 
measured by both subjective rating and eye-gaze duration data. Participants agreed 
that the automation and displays did a good job of integrating information, and they 
liked the new HAT interface to the ACFP (for example, “The sliders, I thought, were 
pretty well done.”; “I loved the HAT…It doesn’t take long to learn.”). 
 
4.2 Experiment 6: Integration of HAT on flight deck  
Since the ground dispatch and the onboard captain share responsibility for the safe-
ty and efficiency of the flight and both must consent on any flight deviations, a clear 
next step was to install the HAT tools on the flight deck. So in the final study, we 
integrated the ACFP, AMMS, and playbook paradigm into an electronic flight bag 
(EFB) and installed it on the flight deck (see Figure 8). Twelve airline transport pilots 
participated in our flight deck assessment of HAT tools which were presented on an 
EFB. Each pilot flew three off-nominal, 15 minute scenarios in both the HAT and no 
HAT conditions. In each condition scenario difficulty varied – high, medium and low.  
 
 
Figure 8. Flight Deck HAT setup: A) EFB for interacting with HAT features. 
 
Lessons learned. We found no differences for HAT ratings on situation aware-
ness, workload or trust. However, participants showed a significant preference for 
HAT over No HAT conditions. Moreover, as with any emerging technology, the par-
ticipants provided suggestions for improving the HAT agent. These suggestions in-
cluded a better voice interface that uses natural language, better labeling of anchor 
points on our slider tools, and suggestions for providing pilots with additional infor-
mation.  
5 Conclusions 
This paper describes a line of research whose goal was to explore the feasibility and 
acceptability of single pilot operations for commercial transport aircraft and the de-
velopment of a human autonomy teaming approach to automation which supported 
the single pilot and flight dispatcher. One of the significant impediments to SPO was 
the loss of nonverbal cues when crews were not co-located. To mitigate this problem 
crews communicated more often and openly discussed roles and responsibility. Nor-
mally the roles and responsibilities are decided by the captain prior to a flight or dur-
ing a flight they both will hand off responsibility as needed with just a nod or a single 
utterance – I got the stick. To remediate this loss of nonverbal cues we developed the 
CRM tools which allowed the team to quickly assess current roles and responsibili-
ties. Data from the first two studies suggested that the suite of tools introduced and 
empirically tested to address CRM challenges stemming from non-co-located crews 
was generally useful although pilots had multiple suggestions for improvement. An-
other impediment was the importance of SA prior to providing dedicated support to a 
single pilot aircraft. This issue had significant implications for how quickly the single 
pilot could expect the needed dedicated support and consequently the number of pi-
lots needed to provide dedicated support. In the third SPO study we found no differ-
ence between our two operational concepts – hybrid and specialist. We concluded 
from this that if the ground station displays present the environmental and systems 
data which are important to gaining overall situation awareness of the vehicle needing 
dedicated support, either concept would be feasible. The data from this study showed 
that with appropriate displays, ground operators can jump in and provide assistance, 
even if they are coming from a place where they have minimal situation awareness. 
Lastly, the final three studies suggest moving to a human autonomy teaming concept 
reduced the need to continuously monitor individual aircraft. With the HAT tools, 
when a problem arose on any particular aircraft, the ground operator would be alerted 
and could call a play which immediately provided resolution alternatives. Additional-
ly, some tasks could be handed off to the automation, reducing task workload.  
In the future we plan to continue the development of our HAT agent, giving it 
some adaptive capabilities, and the ability to learn from its environment. However, we 
will be mindful of Miller and Parasuraman’s [15] caution about the technical and 
philosophical issues with adaptive systems – by their nature they usurp delegation 
authority from the human. Finally, we plan to evaluate the use of HAT concepts and 
tools in our future work on Urban Air Mobility, which seeks to safely and efficiently 
move cargo and passenger in urban areas. 
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